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Murphy: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

McCARTHY V. THOMAS: ARE STATES
BOUND WHEN APPROVAL OF.AN SIP IS
MERELY CONDITIONAL?

I.

INTRODUCTION

In McCarthy v. Thomas, l the Ninth Circuit held that the
Clean Air Act (hereinafter "CAA") authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") to conditionally approve a State Implementation Plan (hereinafter "SIP"), thereby
binding the states even if later EPA actions do not specifically
reference the earlier conditionally approved provisions. 2 In

1. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Wiggins, C.J., the
other panel members were Wallace, J., and Garth, C.J., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation)
2. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1373. State Implementation Plans are mandated
under the CAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. v 1993). These plans are
submitted by the individual states to the EPA. See id. § 7410(a)(1). The plans
document how a state will comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards
[hereinafter "NAAQS"J. [d. The measures provided in each plan are decided by the
individual state and are not dictated by the EPA. See id. § 7410. Under the CAA
amendments in 1990, SIPs in nonattainment areas must include specific measures
such as enforceable emission limits, economic incentives, and schedules for reaching compliance. See id. § 7502. The plans must ensure timely compliance with the
imposed air quality standards. See id. § 7410. In addition, the plans are subjected
to EPA approval. S!!e id. § 7410(k). If the plans are not approved by the EPA
then the state may be faced with penalties. See id. § 7413. Earlier revisions of the
CAA allowed the EPA to impose a moratorium on construction projects in areas
not in compliance with the CAA. See Arizona V. Thomas, 829 F.2d 834 (9th Cir.
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McCarthy, the SIP which included transportation measures for
Pima and Maricopa Counties in Arizona, had never been fully
approved by the EPA, but had received a conditional approval. 3 Since Arizona had difficulty complying with the CAA, the
SIP was revised several times before the EPA granted full
approval. 4 The final plan, approved years later by the EPA,
did not specifically include the transportation provisions originally provided by the state. 5

The McCarthy decision puts the states on notice that commitments made in SIPs are legally binding notwithstanding
the SIP is only conditionally approved. When a state proposes
changes to its SIP, it does not get a new "bite of the apple," but
must adhere to measures already accepted by the EPA. 6
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellants in McCarthy had sought an order from the
district court compelling changes to the mass transit systems
of the cities of Tucson and Phoenix. 7 Arizona had proposed the
transit provisions as part of the original SIP submitted to the
EPA for Pima and Maricopa counties. s The district court refused to grant the order. 9

1987). The current version of the CAA allows the EPA to cut off federal funding
to highway projects located in the nonattainment area. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509
(Supp. V 1993).
3. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1365.
4. See id. at 1367. As discussed in the facts of McCarthy, a number of law
suits were litigated involving the SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties. See id. at
1366.
5. Id. at 1372. See infra note 7 for a discussion of the mass transit provisions that are being contested in McCarthy.
6. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1373.
7. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). The mass
transit plans were submitted for Pima and Maricopa counties in 1979. Id. at 1365.
The transit provision for Pima county was to increase the Tucson transit system
to a fleet of 199 buses which would have required the city to add 59 buses. Id.
Total ridership goals were also included in the plan which called for a yearly
ridership of 14.5 million by the year 1986. Id. The plan for Maricopa County
would have increased the number of buses in Phoenix to 400 with a daily ridership of 112,000. Id. By the time McCarthy was decided, Tucson had a bus fleet of
168 buses and a yearly ridership of 13.6 million. Id. at 1367. Phoenix had a fleet
of 369 buses with a daily ridership of 103,000. Id.
8. See id. at 1365.
9. Id. at 1367.
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The transit provisions were proposed to help reduce the
levels of air pollutants in Pima and Maricopa Counties. 10 The
Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") had
designated these counties as non attainment areas for carbon
monoxide (hereinafter "CO") in 1978. 11 To reduce the CO levels in these counties, Arizona had submitted the transit provisions as one element in their overall control strategy.12 Arizona first submitted the overall plan in 1979, and received conditional approval by the EPA in 1982.13
The EPA did not grant full approval of the SIP due to
concerns unrelated to the mass transit provisions. 14 Arizona
took no action to address the EPA's concerns until the EPA
imposed sanctions limiting construction of new sources of CO
emissions. 15 After failing in an attempt to block the sanctions,
Arizona responded to the EPA's concerns. 16 A revised SIP was
submitted to the EPA and approved in 1988. 17 The EPA approval was documented in the Federal Register, but the summary did not refer to the mass transit measures that had been
approved in 1982.18

.

10. See w.. at 1365.
11. [d. at 1365. Carbon monoxide i8 one of the criteria pollutants that is controlled under the CAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(4)(a). For most urban areas a
m~or source of carbon monoxide comes from automobile emissions. See generally
WILLIAM H. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, Chapter 3 (1994). An area is designated as being in "nonattainment" when it fails to meet the air emission standard
for a criteria pollutant. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2).
12. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1365.
13. [d. The EPA denied full approval because of deficiencies in the plan that
it wanted the state to correct. [d.
14. [d. The summary of the facts provided in the opinion does not identify the
deficiencies in the SIP that the EPA wanted corrected. See w.. However, the summary clearly states that the deficiencies did not concern the provisions for transit
improvements. See w..
15. Arizona v. Thomas, 829 F.2d 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1987). The EPA imposed
sanctions because it found that the SIP submitted by Arizona did not result in
timely compliance with the air quality standards for carbon monoxide. See w.. at
835. Arizona had argued that the EPA should have allowed it to revise its plan
prior to imposing the sanctions. [d. The court held that because one of the goals of
the CAA was timely compliance, the actions of the EPA were not "arbitrary or
capricious". [d. at 840.
16. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1366.
17. [d. at 1366 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 30220, 30224 (1988».
18. [d. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 3219, 3220 (1991». All proposed rulemaking and
other pending decisions of the EPA are listed in the federal register prior to final
approval. See generally PERCIVAL et aI., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCI-
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The approved SIP was challenged in Delaney v. Environmental Protection Agency. 19 The citizen plaintiffs in Delaney
petitioned the court to vacate the SIP for Pima and Maricopa
counties. 20 The plaintiffs alleged that the EPA actions were
unreasonable since the SIP did not meet the CAA's statutory
deadlines for compliance. 21 The Ninth Circuit upheld the challenge and vacated the final EPA ruling that had approved the
Arizona SIP. 22
In response to the Ninth Circuit decision in Delaney v.
Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA issued a Federal
Implementation Plan (hereinafter "FIP,,).23 The FIP covered
Pima and Maricopa counties, and incorporated by reference all
of the provisions that had been included in the SIP vacated by
the Ninth Circuit decision. 24

In

The mass transit provisions that were originally proposed
1979 had never been fully implemented. 25 As a result, the

ENCE, AND POLICY, Chapter Five (1992). This is done so that interested parties
will have the opportunity to comment on proposed actions. See id. In addition it
informs interested parties of actions that have been approved by the EPA. See id.
19. Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990). The Delaney court reviewed
the control provisions in the SIP aimed at lowering CO levels in Maricopa and
Pima counties. See id. at 691·95. The Delaney plaintiffs argued that additional
control measures were needed in the SIP to accelerate the attainment of CO emis·
sions. See id. at 692.
20. ld. at 688.
21. ld. at 689·90. The 1977 amendments to the CAA required states to be in
compliance with air quality standards by 1982. ld. Arizona had failed to meet this
date for CO levels for Pima and Maricopa counties. See generally id. at 689·91.
The Delaney court held that Congress's intent was that states not in compliance
with the CAA must meet the standards as soon as possible. ld. at 691. For a
good discussion of the problems involved in bringing nonattainment areas into
compliance with the CAA, see generally RODGERS, supra note 11, at 210·22.
22. ld. at 694.
23. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1367 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 5458, 5459 (1991)). Under
the provisions of the CAA the EPA has the ultimate responsibility to see that
states meet the guidelines of the act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990). If the state
plans fail to meet the statutory guidelines then the EPA is required to promulgate
an FIP. See id. § 741O(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that the plan provided by
Arizona did not comply with the CAA. Delaney, 898 F.2d at 695. As a result the
EPA was required by the act to generate an FIP for the state. ld.
24. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1366.
25. ld. at 1367. To meet the original transit goals, Tucson needed to add an
additional 31 busses to its fleet, and increase yearly ridership by one million pas·
sengers. See id. at 1365, 1367. Phoenix also needed to increase its fleet by 31
busses and increase ridership by 9,000 passengers a day to meet its goal. See id.
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McCarthy appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, seeking an injunction
against the cities of Tucson and Phoenix. 26 The district court
dismissed the suit, ruling that the mass transit provisions
were not enforceable since they were not part of a final approved plan. 27

The citizens appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 28 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, but did not impose the injunction sought by the appellants. 29 Instead, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to fashion the final remedy.30
The McCarthy court held that the EPA's conditional approval of the SIP was binding and thus, the state was responsible for the transportation control measures. 31 The court reasoned that enforcement of the measures set forth in the earlier
conditionally approved revision of the SIP was not dependent
on whether the transportation control measures were included
in the final approved plan. 32 The fact that these measures
were never deleted was sufficient to put the state on notice
that the state was still responsible for their implementation. 33
Furthermore, the court held that changing the party responsible for the SIP from the state to the EPA, by imposing an FIP,

26. Id. at 1367.
27. Id. The district court ruled that the earlier provisions were not binding
since the EPA's plan in 1991 did not specifically reference them. Id. The district
court reasoned that "final" approval meant that the plan would not require any
further revision. Id. Therefore, since the plan submitted in 1982 was acknowledged
to require further revision it could not be defined as final. See id. In the alternative, the district court reasoned that even if the mass transit provisions submitted
in 1982 were enforceable, the Ninth Circuit subsequently vacated the plan. See id.
at 1370. Therefore, the district court held that once the plan was vacated, the
mass transit provisions would need to be re-submitted and approved to be enforceable. Id.
28. See Id. at 1367.
29. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1373. The decision to remand without requiring the
state to comply with the provisions may have been to allow the parties to work
out other possible settlements.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 1370. See generally RODGERS, supra note 11, at Chapter Three
for a discussion of the EPA approval process for SIPs.
33. See id. at 1370 n.2.
.
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did not relieve the state of its earlier commitments. 34
III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT: BACKGROUND
The Clean Air Act was first enacted in 1963, making it one
of the earliest environmental statutes. 35 Since 1963, the CAA
has been revised on several occasions, each revision has attempted to provide more comprehensive controls for reducing
air pollution. 36 The 1990 amendments made significant changes to the statute, and clarified the EPA's authority to conditionally approve SIPs. 37
A.

1990 CAA AMENDMENTS: IMPACT ON CONDITIONAL
AFPROVAL OF SIPs

Prior to the 1990 amendments, a number of lawsuits were
litigated regarding the authority of the EPA to review and
approve SIPs. 38 Two common questions involved the extent of
public participation required for SIP reviews, and the possibility that SIPs could be subdivided with only parts being approved. 39 The concern in these suits, as echoed in McCarthy v.
Thomas, was that piecemeal approval may result in the avoidance of stricter procedural requirements. 4O
However, the EPA's power to approve portions of SIPs
with provisions pending appears to have been cemented
through the 1990 CAA amendments. 41 A basis suggested for

34. See id.
35. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, Chapter Three
(1994). The CAA was preceded by the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955. See id. at
130. However, the Air Pollution Control Act left most of the responsibility for air
pollution control with the states. ld.
36. See generally id. at Chapter 3 for a thorough overview of the 1990 CAA
amendments.
37. See generally id. at 196-214.
38. See generally WILLIAM H. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, at 196-202
(1994) ..
39. See generally id.
40. See id. at 201 n.32 (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d
1028 (7th Cir. 1984». The court disallowed the EPA to let states avoid stricter
procedures by calling their action a partial approval. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 742
F.2d at 1035.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3)-(4). These provisions give the EPA authorization
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allowing this type of piecemeal approval was to protect the
EPA's administrative discretion. 42 Since the SIP consists of
many diverse elements, the EPA needs the ability to approve
portions of plans that promote improved air quality.43 The
McCarthy court's analysis interprets provisions of the CAA
that had been in effect prior to the 1990 amendments. 44
B.

GoALS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

The CAA is structured to address pollutants which pose
significant risks to human health and the environment. 45
These "top offenders" are defined in the CAA as "criteria pollutants."46 The CAA required the EPA to develop a list of
these pollutants by January 30, 1971.47 Initially, the EPA listed five types of substances as criteria pollutants: sulfur oxides,
particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants. 48 Since that time, only lead and nitrogen oxides
have been added to the list while hydrocarbons have been
removed from the list.
The criteria pollutants are controlled through the use of
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (hereinafter
"NAAQS,,).49 NAAQS are uniform emission limitations set by
the EPA for each of the criteria pollutants. 50

for partial and conditional approvals of SIPs. See id.
42. See RODGERS, supra note 35, at 202.
43. See id. at 202.
44. See McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994).
45. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).
47. See id. § 7408. Currently the substances included on the list are: sulfur
oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, nitrogen oxides, and
lead. See PERCIVAL et. al., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE AND POI.JCY,
at 771 (1992).
48. RODGERS supra, note 35 at 156-61. The first five criteria pollutants were
sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants. [d. Nitrogen oxides were added to the list by the EPA in 1971. [d. Lead
was also added to the list in 1978 due to litigation. [d. Subsequently hydrocarbons
have been dropped from the list of criteria pollutants. [d.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) and (b). NAAQS consist of a primary air quality standard and a secondary air quality standard for each criteria pollutant. See id. The
primary standards are set to allow an adequate margin of safety requisite to protect the public health. See id. The secondary ambient air quality standards specify
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In broad terms, the SIPs are a vehicle for "implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of the NAAQS for each
state. 51 The SIP requirements are set forth in Section
7410(a)(2) of the CAA, with the major elements as follows:
enforceable emission limitations for the criteria pollutants;
programs to monitor ambient air quality; programs to enforce
emission limitations; programs to control source emissions; and
evidence of adequate state funding and authority to implement
the plan. 52
The EPA reviews and approves SIPs prepared by the state
to ensure that the SIP complies with the CAA.53 If the EPA
finds that the SIP is inadequate, the EPA has different enforcement options available under the CAA.54
C. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Initial responsibility for enforcement of the CAA is left to
each state. 55 Each state develops an SIP showing how it will
achieve and maintain the ambient air quality standards for
every quality control region in the state. 56 Each SIP must include a demonstration of not only how the air quality limits
will be reached, but how the limits will be maintained. 57
The SIP is submitted to the EPA for approval, and once
approved by the EPA, the SIP is binding upon the state. 58 A
a level of air quality to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated
adverse affects. See id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). Under section 7407 of the CAA, each state is divided up into air quality control regions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407. Air quality control
regions were first required under the Air Quality Act of 1967. See RODGERS supra
note 35, at 131. An air quality region is defined by both scientific factors, such as
meteorological characteristics, as well as political factors. [d. The EPA has identified 247 air quality control regions in the United States. [d. A specific air quality
region could have different designations for each criteria pollutant. [d. at 132. As
an example, the area could be designated as an attainment area for nitrogen oxides while being a non-attainment for carbon monoxide. See id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2).
53. See id. at § 7410(k).
54. [d. at § 7411(m) and § 7413.
55. See id. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
57. See id. § 7410(a)(2).
58. See [d.
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state's failure to comply with the provisions of the SIP may
result in the imposition of sanctions by the EPA. 59 In addition, citizen suits may be filed against the state or the EPA
administrator for failure to enforce the provisions of the
CAA.60
The EPA, upon initial review, may reject the plan presented by the state as· inadequate to meet the requirements of the
statute. 61 Upon rejection, the plan is returned to the state for
revision. 62 Once the state is delinquent in submitting the original or the revised SIP, the EPA is required to generate a Federal Implementation Plan. 63
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit reviewed existing case law and held
that statutory interpretations by federal agencies, if reasonable, should receive deferrence. 64
A. THE CLEAN AIR ACT ALLOWS CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF
SIPs
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the
decision reached by the district court. 65 The district court
ruled that provisions of a state or federal plan are not enforceable until specifically included in a final approved plan. 66 The

59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(m) and § 7413. These sections discuss federal enforcement of the CAA. See id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. This provision applies to any failure by the EPA in
enforcing the CAA. See generally RODGERS, supra note 37, at Chapter 3. For example, a citizen suit may be brought against the EPA for improperly approving a
SIP or against the state for not implementing its SIP. Id. When brought against
the state, the citizen suit is acting for the EPA which has failed to perform their
administrative duties. Id.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k). This section of the CAA outlines the EPA review
of a SIP. Id.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5).
63. See id. § 741O(c). The FIP is written to deal with those portions of the
SIP found to be inadequate. Id. In the present case, a FIP was written only to
deal with CO levels for Pima and Maricopa counties. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1367.
64. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1368-70 (9th Cir. 1994).
65. See id. at 1367.
66. 1d.
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use of conditional approval was merely a shorthand method
indicating that final approval would be forthcoming when remaining conditions were met. 67
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this approach would be
potentially counter-productive to the statutory process of ensuring compliance with the Clean Air Act. 68 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency routinely
receives numerous revisions to implementation plans. 69 By
following the district court's ruling, and not combining measures from earlier plans, Arizona would still fail to comply
with the CAA.70 Under the district court's reasoning, no version of the plan, even that accepted by the district court, included enough measures to meet air quality standards for
carbon monoxide. 71
B.

THE EPA CAN APPROVE SIPs THAT ARE SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLETE

In reviewing previous Ninth Circuit cases interpreting the
provisions of the CAA regarding EPA approval of State Implementation Plans, the Ninth Circuit found that Kamp v.
Hernandez was controlling. 72
In Kamp, the Ninth Circuit held that an SIP may receive
EPA approval even if it does not fully comply with the CAA.73
67. See id. at 1368.
68. Id. at 1370.
69. See id. at 1369-70. In the fact section of the opinion, the Ninth Circuit
outlines the involved proceedings that have occurred in developing the implementation plan for Arizona. See id. at 1365.
70. Id. at 1370. The district court did find that a final plan existed for complying with the air quality standards of the CAA. See id. at 1367. The EPA argued that the plan referenced by the district court was itself incomplete. See id.
at 1370. This plan also relied on other provisions which were not explicitly contained in the plan. Id. Using the logic of the district court, no final approved plan
would exist for Arizona. Id.
71. See id. at 1370.
72. Id. at 1368 (citing Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1985».
73. See Kamp, 752 F.2d at 1455. Kamp involved the EPA's approval of SIPs
submitted by Arizona to limit sulfur dioxide emissions from copper smelters. See
Id. at 1446. The EPA's approval of the plan was challenged by a resident of Arizona. Id. One of the contentions raised by the resident was that the plan approved by the EPA was not final. See id. at 1449. The plan did not account for
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An SIP's absolute compliance with Section 7410(a)(2) of the
CAA is not required before the EPA can confirm the SIP. 74
The EPA can approve a substantially complete implementation
plan if the state provides the EPA assurances that the plan
will be promptly finished. 75 The Kamp court added that the
EPA could not consider the plan substantially complete if the
plan circumvented the requirements of the CAA.76
In comparing Kamp to McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit found
that both plans were substantially complete. 77 Whether the
EPA approved the plan as final with actions pending, as in
Kamp, or conditionally approved with actions pending, as in
McCarthy, was irrelevant.1s In either case, the plans would be
equally enforceable. 79 The Ninth Circuit held that the plan
submitted in 1982 by Arizona was "substantially complete."so
Applying the holding in Kamp, the Ninth Circuit found that
the mass transit provisions were part of an enforceable plan
and were binding on the cities. s1

sulfur dioxide emissions that escape during the smeltering process. See id. at
1453. The plan did require that Arizona study and submit revised measures to
show how these emissions would be controlled. See id. at 1449. The court found
this type of contingent or "conditional" approval to be allowed by the CAA. [d. at
1454.
74. [d. at 1455. This section of the CAA provides the elements that each state
must include within its SIP. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
75. See Kamp, 752 F.2d at 1453-54.
76. See id. at 1455. The Kamp court did not define what made a plan substantially complete. The author believes from the holding in Kamp that this decision would depend on the facts of the particular case. Per the 1990 amendments
to the CAA, the EPA can conditionally approve a plan if the state commits to
adopt specific enforceable measures by a certain date. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(4).
77. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1368. The court looked to the conditional approval
that the EPA made in 1982. See id. at 1368. The deficiencies that the EPA had
found in the plan were deemed to be minor by the court. [d. at 1368. The Ninth
Circuit in Kamp held that the EPA could approve plans that were substantially
complete. Kamp, 752 F.2d at 1455. Since the deficiencies in McCarthy were
deemed as minor, the EPA approval was binding on the state. See McCarthy, 27
F.3d at 1369. Calling the approval conditional did not impact its effect on the
state. [d.
78. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369.
79. [d.
80. [d. at 1368-69.
8l. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369. The court's holding in Kamp was that the
EPA has the authority to approved SIPs that are substantially complete. Kamp,
752 F.2d at 1455.
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AGENCY READING OF STATUTE NEED MERELY BE
REASONABLE AND NEED NOT CONSTITUTE THE ONLY
INTERPRETATION

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the reasonableness of the
EPA's view that the CAA authorized the EPA to conditionally
approve SIPs. 82 The court looked at the agency's action in
light of the pre-1990 provisions of the CAA, which allowed the
EPA to approve any "submitted plan or portion thereof.,,83 The
Ninth Circuit concurred with the EPA's interpretation that
ratifying a portion of a plan would be meaningless unless the
endorsed portion was binding. 84 Pursuant to this interpretation, the Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the plan that is
confirmed by the EPA becomes binding on the date it is approved. 85 The court found that endorsing measures which partially ensure compliance in non attainment areas was similar to
approving a portion of a plan. 86 Therefore, the court found
that the EPA had authority under the CAA to ratify provisions
of a plan even if the plan as a whole was incomplete. 87
The court found an alternate basis· allowing conditional
approvals of SIPs in Section 7410(c)(1) of the CAA, which defines when the EPA must issue a Federal Implementation Plan
(hereinafter "FIP,,).88 A state can stop the EPA from issuing
82. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1368.
83. 1d. at 1369 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (1988)).
The CAA underwent major revisions in ·1990. See generally RODGERS, supra note
35, at Chapter 3. The 1990 amendments to the CAA clarified the EPA's authority
to either partially or conditionally approve plans. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369
(citing, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(4». The SIPs litigated in
McCarthy were prepared prior to the 1990 amendments to the CAA. See id. at
1365-67.
84. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369.
85. See id. The court stated that conditional measures become part of the final
plan when the EPA approves the measures. 1d.
86. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369.
87. See id. The court viewed the CAA as allowing the EPA to approve implementation plans incrementally. 1d.
88. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(l) (1988)). As discussed in the background section of this summary, the state is the party responsible for implementing measures in the SIP to meet NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V
1993). The EPA is required to issue a FIP only if the state fails to submit a plan
that the EPA can approve. See 42 U.S.C. § 741O(c). The state can stop the EPA
from issuing a FIP if it corrects its plan. 1d. The state can submit corrections up
till the time that the EPA issues its FIP. 1d. When that occurs, the FIP is bind-
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an FIP if the state corrects the deficiencies in the plan. 89 The
Ninth Circuit interpreted Section 7410(c)(1) as allowing the
EPA to confirm a plan with conditions, prior to granting full
approval. 90 This reading of the CAA was viewed as reasonable
by the court since the CAA already allowed the EPA to approve portions of plans. 91
In McCarthy, the EPA acted to endorse mass transit provisions to help achieve air quality standards for CO. 92 At the
same time, the EPA stayed final approval until additional
control measures were added. 93 The EPA had noted only minor deficiencies in their action, confirming the SIP for Pima
and Maricopa counties. 94 The Ninth Circuit deemed that the
EPA's actions were a reasonable interpretation of the CAA.95
In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that the
reading of the statute by the EPA need merely be reasonable
and need not constitute the only interpretation. 96
The court then summarized actions taken by the EPA in
the present case. 97 The EPA was provided with a plan for
Maricopa and Pima counties to help those counties meet air
quality standards by increasing mass transit in Tucson and
Phoenix. 98 These measures, approved by the EPA in the "notice of final rulemaking" published in the Federal Register in
1982, were to take effect with full approval pending. 99 The
Ninth Circuit found that these actions were reasonable and
fully consistent with the interpretation of the CAA made by
the EPA lOO The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the agency
ing on the state. [d.
89. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1988».
90. [d.
91. See id. In addition the court noted that this incremental approach would
help ensure that NMQS would be met expeditiously as required by the CM. [d.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) (1988».
92. [d. at 1365.
93. [d.

94. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1368.
95. [d. at 1369·70.
96. See id. at 1369 (citing City of Seabrook v. EPA, 659 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
97. McCarthy, 27 F.2d at 1369.
98. [d. (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 19328, 29534 (1982».
99. [d. at 1365 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 29532·29534 and 47 Fed. Reg. 19326·28
(1982».
100. [d. at 1369, 1370 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
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action should be given deference. lol
D. PIMA AND MARICOPA COUNTIES ARGUMENT

The cities' first argument relied on the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in Delaney v. Environmental Protection Agency.102 In Delaney, concerned citizens attacked the EPA's approval of the SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties. loa The appellants in Delaney argued that the SIPs approved by the EPA
did not include adequate control measures for CO. 104 In its
analysis, the court listed the particular pollution control measures for CO that were included in the SIPs. lo5 The Delaney
court also noted that specific recommendations to expand mass
transit in Maricopa and Pima counties had been rejected by
the state. lOG The cities relied on the statements in Delaney to
show that mass transit improvements were not part of the
approved SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties. 107
However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the mass transit
measures discussed in Delaney from those in McCarthy.lOs
The Ninth Circuit stated that the mass transit measures referenced in Delaney were additional measures that the state had
considered. lo9 Therefore, the rejection of these later proviCouncil, 467 U.S. 837 (1984».
101. 1d. at 1370. In Chevron the Court had adopted a two part test for reviewing agency decisions. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. See generally PERCIVAL et aI.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE, AND POLICY, 746-54 (1992) for a discussion of the Chevron holding. The first part of the Chevron test looked to the
statute to determine if it were clear on its face. See id. If the statute was not
ambiguous, agency decisions were to be given deference unless they were found to
be an abuse of discretion. See id.
102. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1371 (citing Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d
687 (9th Cir. 1990».
103. See Delaney, 898 F.2d at 692.
104. 1d. at 691-92.
105. 1d. at 691. The court listed three control measures as being included in
the EPA approved SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties: 1) gas stations must sell
only oxygenated fuels in the winter when CO levels are the highest; 2) large employers must encourage car pooling; and 3) automobile inspections must test car
emissions while under load and at idle. 1d.
106. See id. at 692.
107. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371 (citing Delaney, 898 F.2d at 691).
108. 1d.
109. See id. at 1370. The mass transit measures discussed in Delaney came
from studies done in 1987 and 1988. See Delaney, 898 F.2d at 691. The mass
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sions had no impact on the earlier mass transit prOVISIOns
approved by the EPA. 110
The City of Tucson asserted that the mass transit provisions were not valid, based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Arizona v. Thomas.l11 The Arizona court found that the SIPs
for Pima and Maricopa counties were inadequate, and upheld
the imposition of sanctions by the EPA against Arizona. 112
Tucson argued that if an SIP was judged to be inadequate, all
previous provisions included in those plans were voided. 113
However, the court stated that Tucson applied too "expansive"
a reading to the holding in Arizona. 114 The decision reached
in Arizona only upheld the EPA's determination that the SIP
for Pima and Maricopa counties would not achieve air quality
standards in a timely manner.115 The EPA's use of sanctions
was, therefore, upheld by the court in that case. 116 The decision in Arizona, according to the Ninth Circuit, did not disturb
any prior control measures approved by the EPA. ll7
Finally, Tucson relied on California ex rel. California Air
Resources Bd. v. EPA 118 to support the proposition that disapproved or deleted provisions of a state implementation plan are
not enforceable. 119 In California Air Resources Board, Nevada
and California both had SIPs that included the Lake Tahoe

transit improvements were not the same as the ones committed to in 1979. Mc·
Carthy, 27 F.3d at 1371.
110. [d. at 1371.
111. [d. (citing Arizona v. Thomas, 829 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1987». Arizona challenged the EPA's right to impose bans on construction of new sources of CO. Arizona, 829 F.2d at 835. These sanctions were imposed by the EPA after a finding
that the Arizona SIP was inadequate. [d. Arizona argued that the EPA should
have allowed Arizona a chance to revise the SIPs prior to imposing the sanctions.
See id. at 837-38. Arizona based this argument on the fact that the EPA had
conditionally approved the SIPs. [d. at 838. The court held that the Arizona SIPs
were inadequate, and allowed the EPA to impose the sanctions. See id. at 840.
112. See Arizona, 829 F.2d at 840.
113. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371.
114. [d. at 1371.
115. [d.
116. Arizona, 829 F.2d at 840.
117. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371.
118. California ex reI. California Air Resources Bd. v. EPA, 774 F.2d 1437 (9th
Cir. 1985).
119. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1372 (citing California Air Resources Bd., 774 F.2d
1437).
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Basin area which borders the two states. 120 The states were
in court challenging the adequacy of each other's SIP for this
region. 121 The California Air Resources Board court held that
a state does not have to include all pollution control measures
from an earlier plan in future revisions. 122 The McCarthy
court distinguished California Air Resources Board by noting
that the mass transit measures proposed by Maricopa and
Pima counties had never been deleted. 123 Therefore, Tucson's
reliance on California Air Resources Board was misguided. 124
In addition to Tucson's arguments, the City of Phoenix
raised two additional challenges. 125 The first was that the
mass transit provisions of 1982 were invalid since they did not
comply with the CAA.126 Phoenix argued that the CAA required that measures submitted in implementation plans be
backed up by written evidence. 127 The written evidence would
include information showing local government support for the
measures, and a timetable and schedule for compliance. 128
The city reasoned that because the transit measures approved
by the EPA in 1982 failed to meet this requirement, they were
never enforceable. 129 The court dismissed this argument as
being untimely because Phoenix had sixty days to object to the
EPA approval after it was granted in 1982.130 By failing to

120. California Air Resources Bd., 774 F.2d 1437. The EPA had approved the
SIPs for both California and Nevada that included the Lake Tahoe Basin. Id. at
1439. Both states were challenging the EPA's approval of the other's SIP for this
region. Id. Each state was contesting that the other state's SIP was inadequate to
meet the air quality standards for the Lake Tahoe Basin. See id. at 1440 and
1442. The court upheld the EPA's approval of both state's SIPs. See id. at 1443.
121. California Air Resources Board, 774 F.2d at 1439.
122. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1372. The decision in California Air Resources
Board was that a state should be allowed the flexibility to experiment with its
pollution control measures. See California Air Resources Board, 774 F.2d at 1442.
Such experimentation may mean that certain measures once thought to be beneficial are dropped, and replaced with new measures. Id.
123. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371.
124. See Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1372. Phoenix' argument attacked the EPA conditional approval of
the SIP more on procedural than substantive grounds. Id.
127. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1372.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. See generally PERCIVAL, supra note 101 at Chapter 5 for an overview of
the administrative process for approval of agency regulations.
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object, Phoenix waived the right to challenge that approval. 131
Phoenix' second argument questioned the court's interpretation of the CAA, claiming that the court's reading would
place a significant burden on states when challenging agency
action. 132 Phoenix argued that the court's view would require
an extended search of past EPA approvals to determine the
current enforceable pollution control measures. 133 The Ninth
Circuit indicated that Phoenix overstated the difficulty of this
task because this information could be found by looking at the
Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Register. 134 Also, the court reasoned that the state could look to its own files
to determine what provisions were submitted to the EPA. 135
E.

THE COURT'S HOLDING: EPA's CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF
AN SIP Is BINDING AND DOES NOT RESULT IN THE
DELETION OF THE TRANSPORTATION PROVISIONS FROM THE
SIP

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the issues raised and held that
the district court's ruling was based on an incorrect premise. 136 The court found that measures approved conditionally
by the EPA are binding on the state. 137 These measures remain in later plans without requiring the EPA to specifically
reference them. in later notices of final approval. 138 The mass
transit measures were enforceable when incorporated into the
SIP in 1982, and since the provisions were never deleted, are
still enforceable. 139

131. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1372.
132. See id. Phoenix' claim was that the EPA's record made it difficult to track
current enforceable measures. See id.
133. 1d.
134. 1d. at 1372-73.
135. 1d.
136. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1994). The district
court did not view the mass transit provisions as being part of any plan receiving
final approval by the EPA. 1d.
137. 1d. at 1373.
138. 1d.
139. 1d. Although the court found that the provisions were still enforceable, the
court stopped short of forcing the cities to comply with the measures. See id. Instead the court remanded the case to the district court to determine the final
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V. CONCLUSION
The Clean Air Act has broad and ambitio~s goals to protect the public health and welfare. 14o However, its implementation has taken many years, ignited much litigation, and its
goals have still not been fully achieved. 141 Each state is given the opportunity to devise its own plan for reaching these
goals. 142 However, full compliance with the CAA requires
some tough policy decisions and sacrifices on the part of the
state that may impact economic growth. After twenty years,
many states remain without acceptable plans in place to cope
with air pollution. 143
In McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit was unsympathetic to
Arizona's plea that it was unfair to hold it hostage to provisions submitted years in the past.144 A state's decision. to
commit to provisions to help lower air pollution binds the state
to these measures until they are complete. 145
The Ninth Circuit's decision puts the states on notice that
the court will not permit them to circumvent standards for
controlling air pollution. A state cannot claim that each time it
submits a new plan to the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter "EPA") the slate is wiped clean, and all previous
plans are no longer applicable. This interpretation grants the
state too much discretion, and would thwart Congress and the
EPA in achieving the ever elusive goals of the CAA.

Edward P. Murphy'
remedy. ld. The author believes that this was most likely done to allow the state
the opportunity to reach a settlement with the citizen group.
140. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, Chapter Three
(1994).
141. See generally PERCIVAL et aI., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY, Chapter Six (1992).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section outlines the
steps that a state must consider in preparing its plan for complying with the
CAA. See id.
143. See generally RODGERS, supra note 140, at Chapter Three. This chapter
has a thorough discussion of the various policy decisions and economic impacts of
compliance with the CAA. See id.
144. See McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1994).
145. ld.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/15

18

